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In Financial Services Authority v Information
Commissioner [2009] EWHC 1548 (Admin) the High Court considered
whether information requested from the FSA under the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 ("FOIA") was protected from disclosure by virtue of
the provisions on confidential information in s.348 Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA").
The FSA's appeal was substantially upheld
and the Court (Munby J) held that most of the information should not be
disclosed.
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This judgment clarifies the approach to be adopted
to requests for the identity of firms involved in regulatory
investigations by the FSA and the scope of the confidentiality
provisions in s.348 FSMA. The Court held that a disclosure of
information cannot be regarded in isolation but must be considered
in the light of the request which instigates it. This approach has
implications for other regulators. For example, Ofgem, Ofcom and the
CAA have all relied on confidentiality provisions in their governing
legislation to resist disclosure under FOIA.
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Regulators and those firms which submit information
to them will derive some comfort from the decision, which confirms
that the Information Commissioner and Tribunal adopted an unduly
narrow approach to the meaning of 'confidential information' and
erred in failing to consider the disputed information in context.
The effect of the judgment is likely to be that the FSA (and
possibly other regulators) can successfully resist more information
requests on the basis that a statutory bar on disclosure applies.
The information requests
The appeal arose from two separate information requests. In the first
case, the requester wanted to know which providers had been found to
have used 'inappropriate charges' in setting premiums for endowment
related products, following an FSA review in 2001. The second request
was prompted by a 2005 press release referring to the results of a
mystery shopping exercise which revealed inadequate advice on equity
release schemes. The requester sought the identity of all the firms
which were 'mystery shopped' and a smaller number which were subject to
a follow-up investigation. The FSA refused to disclose the information
and the requesters complained to the Information Commissioner, who found
that the information should be disclosed. The Information Tribunal
agreed, so the FSA appealed to the Court.
The FOIA exemption for statutory prohibitions on disclosure and
s348 FSMA
FOIA provides a right of access to information held by public
authorities, subject to exemptions. Section 44 (1) (a) provides an
exemption for information if its disclosure 'is prohibited by or under
any enactment.' Section 348 FSMA is one such statutory prohibition on
disclosure. It provides that 'confidential' information must not be
disclosed without the consent of the person who supplied it or to whom
it relates. 'Confidential' in this context has a very particular
meaning, namely:
"information which (a) relates to the business or other affairs of
any person; (b) was received by the primary recipient for the purposes
of, or in the discharge of, any functions of the Authority…(c) is not
prevented from being confidential information by subsection (4)."
Subsection (4) provides that information is not confidential if it is
already in the public domain or where "(b) it is in the form of a
summary or collection of information so framed that it is not possible
to ascertain from it information relating to any particular person."
The key issue in this case was whether the identities of the firms
involved in the investigations was 'confidential' information within the
scope of s.348 and thereby protected by s.44 FOIA.
The 'Mortgage Endowment 12'
Munby J focused on the wording of the information request, which
referred to the 'number and identity of providers which used
inappropriate charges to set premiums as described in the FOS Decision
Trees' (a Decision Tree being a type of flowchart used by FOS to show
the different stages of investigation into a complaint).
The FSA had, for the purposes of conducting its review, obtained from
firms information about the charges used in formulating quotations and
the charges actually applied during the policy. This had subsequently
been evaluated by the FSA. However, the question of what constituted
'inappropriate charges' was a simple matter of fact. In interpreting the
request, it was necessary to refer to the Decision Tree, which clarified
the meaning of 'inappropriate charges' to be where the charges actually
used by the firm were higher than those used in setting the premium. As
Munby J put it, this is a question "which involves no process of
evaluation more complex than deciding whether 6 is greater than 4".
Moreover, it was a fact which could only be known to the firm itself and
could therefore only have come to the FSA's knowledge as a result of
information supplied to it by the firms.
Having found that the FSA had 'received' the information as to whether
firms had used 'inappropriate charges', the Court then had to decide
whether the identity of those firms could be disclosed. The FSA argued
that whilst the disclosure of a list of names may not in itself breach
s.348, the information had to be read in context. It argued that when
the names were read in the context of the request for information, the
effect would be to disclose information which manifestly related to the
business of the relevant firms and which had been 'received' by the FSA
in the course of exercising its statutory functions. The Court agreed,
rejecting the Information Commissioner's argument that nothing in the
language of s.348 suggests that anything other than "the information
itself, self-contained and self-referential" should be considered.
Munby J accepted the FSA's argument that the Commissioner's
interpretation was so narrow that it would undermine the important
public policies behind s.348 and emasculate it.
The Mystery Shopping Appeal
There were 2 categories of disputed information involved in the second
appeal. First, the identity of the firms which had been involved in the
mystery shopping exercise; second, the identity of the 7 firms which had
been subject to follow-up investigation.
As to the first category, the Court agreed with the Tribunal's
conclusion that where the FSA had selected firms to take part in the
exercise, the identity of those firms could not fall within s.348 FSMA
as it could not be said that the FSA had "received" that information.
As to the identities of the 7 firms subsequently investigated, the Court
followed the 'composite' approach described above in relation to the
'Mortgage Endowment 12'. The information had to be considered in the
context of the press release and accompanying briefing note, which
explained that "in all of the 7 firms looked at, advisers failed to
explain the link between this type of borrowing and subsequent
investments." The information in the press release and briefing note
was not "confidential" within s.348 because it was anonymised. However,
the effect of releasing the identities of the 7 firms in response to the
FOIA request would be to remove that anonymity and thereby to disclose
confidential information.
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© Herbert Smith LLP 2009

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